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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
PlaintiffAppellee, 
vs. 
EMILY MEHEW, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
Case No. 20020297-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the warrantless search of Mehew's vehicle was permissible and/or 
justified under the Fourth Amendment? In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, 
the trial court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error while its legal conclusions 
are reviewed for correctness. State v. Palmer, 803 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah App. 1990). 
This issue was preserved in motions to suppress and at suppression hearings (R. 
41-48, 87-92, 143, 144). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The text of all controlling statutory and constitutional provisions is set forth in the 
Addenda. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Emily Mehew appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of the 
Honorable Claudia Laycock, Fourth District Court, after the entry of a conditional plea to 
two counts of theft by receiving, class B misdemeanors. 
B, Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Emily Mehew was charged by information filed in Fourth District Court on 
November 30, 2000, with the following criminal violations: two counts of forgery, third 
degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-501; two counts of 
financial transaction card fraud, third degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated § 76-6-506.1; and two counts of receiving stolen property, a class A and a 
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-46(1) (R. 1-2). 
Prior to the preliminary hearing, the two forgery charges and one count of 
financial transaction card fraud were dismissed (R. 13, 16). On March 5, 2001, a 
preliminary hearing was held before the Honorable Lynn W. Davis (R. 18-19). At the 
close of the hearing Judge Davis dismissed the remaining count of financial transaction 
fraud and bound the two receiving stolen property charges over for trial (R. 19, 142 at 
42). Mehew was arraigned and entered "not guilty" pleas to the theft by receiving 
charges (R. 18-19, 142 at 43). 
On June 5, 2001, Mehew filed a motion to suppress evidence on grounds that the 
search of her vehicle constituted an illegal warrantless search under the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution (R. 41-48). On June 12, 2001, a 
suppression hearing was held before the Honorable Claudia Laycock and she orally 
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denied the motion (R. 58, 143). On June 19, 2001, Mehew filed a second motion to 
suppress which asserted that the police cannot rely on exigent circumstances that they 
create (R. 87-92). On September 5, 2001, Judge Laycock heard oral argument on the 
suppression issues (R. 102, 144). On November 6, 2001, Judge Laycock denied 
Mehew's suppression motions in a signed memorandum decision (R. 104-13). 
On or about December 6, 2001, Mehew entered a pleas of "guilty5' to two counts 
of receiving stolen property, class B misdemeanors, conditioned upon her right to appeal 
the denial of her motions to suppress (R. 118-20). 
On March 4, 2002, Mehew was sentenced to six months in the Utah County Jail, 
and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $300.00 on each count. The sentence was 
stayed pending appeal (R. 129-30, 145). 
On April 3, 2002, Mehew filed a Notice of Appeal in Fourth District Court and 
this action commenced (R. 134). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
A. Preliminary Hearing Testimony 
Dustin Dastrup testified that in November of 2000 his car was burglarized outside 
his residence on 900 South in Orem (R. 142 at 5-6). His backpack was taken from the 
car and inside of the backpack was his wallet which contained checks, credit cards and 
some cash (R. 142 at 6). Dastrup testified that he does not know Emily Mehew nor has 
he ever given her permission to possess the property that was taken from the vehicle (R. 
142 at 6-7). 
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Joel Clark testified that his car was also burglarized in November of 2000 (R. 142 
at 8). Clark testified that his Franklin Planner was missing so he called the bank to close 
his account (R. 142 at 9). The bank later called Clark and indicated that a bankcard in 
his wife's name had been used at Jiffy Lube and at Sound Warehouse (R. 142 at 9). 
Clark does not know Emily Mehew (R. 142 at 11). 
Kyle Allman is employed at Sound Warehouse on 800 North State Street at Orem 
(R. 142 at 13). On November 21, 2000, he sold a stereo to a "Dustin Dastrup" and 
installed it in a vehicle (R. 142 at 13-14). The stereo was paid for with a bankcard in the 
name of "Linda Clark" whom "Dastrup" indicated was his mother (R. 142 at 15). 
Allman testified that Mehew was with "Dastrup" when the stereo was purchased and 
installed (R. 142 at 16). Allman testified that he believes the stereo was installed in 
Mehew's vehicle (R. 142 at 17). 
Provo City Police Officer Hiatt Bean investigated the two vehicle burglaries and 
the use of the Clark bankcard at Jiffy Lube and Sound Warehouse (R. 142 at 23-27). 
Bean testified that Allman identified Mehew from a photo-lineup (R. 142 at 27). Bean 
contacted Mehew at her residence in Orem (R. 142 at 28). Mehew's vehicle was in the 
driveway and Bean "looked inside [her] car" and found that the vehicle's CD player had 
a faceplate that matched the CD player that had been installed by Sound Warehouse (R. 
142 at 28). Bean then approached the house and learned from Mehew's sister that she 
was asleep (R. 142 at 28). Eventually Mehew came upstairs and spoke with Bean (Id.). 
According to Bean, Mehew eventually admitted that she had been at Sound Warehouse 
with her boyfriend, Tyson, and that he had purchased a strearo for her and had it installed 
in her vehicle (R. 142 at 29). Bean arrested Mehew, seized her vehicle and it was driven 
to the Provo Police Department where an inventory search of the car was performed (R. 
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142 at 29-30, 33-35). A green backpack with a black leather planner and a brown-
covered checkbook inside which belonged to Clark were found in the car (R. 142 at 30). 
Bean testified that his justification for seizing the vehicle was: "There was stolen 
property in the vehicle that I needed to get. It was early morning hours. I did not have 
the ability with me there to take the property from the vehicle, I felt; without damaging 
that property" (R. 142 at 35). Bean did not have a warrant to seize the vehicle (R. 142 at 
35). 
B. Suppression Hearing Testimony 
Provo Police Officer Hiatt Bean testified as follows at a suppression hearing held 
in this matter on June 12, 2001 (R. 143): 
During his investigation of the two auto burglaries, Bean learned of a vehicle 
description (red Baretta) and a license plate number which showed Mehew as the owner 
(R. 143 at 9). A check on the license plate also gave an address for Mehew in Orem (R„ 
143 at 9). 
Bean contacted the Orem Police Department (R. 143 at 10). Bean drove by 
Mehew's Orem residence looking for the red vehicle (R. 143 at 10). Bean also asked the 
Orem police to continue checking the residence (R. 143 at 10). Bean was later contacted 
around midnight by the Orem police that the vehicle was at the residence (R. 143 at 10° 
11). 
Bean then went to the Orem residence with Officer Ahlborn and met an Orem 
officer at the scene (R. 143 at 11). The officers found the vehicle with the matching 
license plate number in the driveway (R. 143 at 11). Bean looked into the vehicle and 
"noticed that the face plate on the stereo looked identical to the one that [he'd] been 
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shown at the Sound Warehouse where the stereo had been purchased with the stolen 
credit card" (R. 143 at 11). Bean also learned from the salesperson at Sound Warehouse 
that the individuals who purchased the stereo were going to Wendover (R. 143 at 13). 
Bean then approached the residence, came in contact with Mehew and 
interviewed her (R. 143 at 11-12). Bean asked Mehew for the identity of the male 
individual that used the credit card and whether she had been to Wendover the previous 
day (R. 143 at 12). Mehew initially told Bean that she had been with "some guy named 
Dustin" but later admitted that she was with her boyfriend Tyson (R. 143 at 13-14). 
Mehew's family had also told Bean that Mehew had been to Wendover with Tyson (R. 
143 at 13-14). 
Bean asked Mehew about the stereo and was told that her boyfriend wanted to buy 
her a stereo so they went to Sound Warehouse where a stereo was purchased for her 
vehicle (R. 143 at 14-15). Bean then arrested Mehew (R. 143 at 15). 
Bean testified that he had been told by Mehew that Tyson had "access to [her] 
vehicle and had taken it when we wanted" (R. 143 at 15). Bean told Mehew that "the 
stereo that was inside her car had been purchased with a stolen credit card, and that it 
needed to be retrieved. And that we had a couple of options. And because I was afraid 
that, one we still didn't know where [Tyson] lived..." and had not contacted him and that 
there was concern that he would "come and take the car, if the family members would 
call him and let him know that we had arrested Emily" (R. 143 at 15-16). Accordingly, 
Bean told Mehew that "her options were, one, we would take the vehicle with a tow 
truck where she would incur costs on the tow. Or she could give us the keys, we'd have 
an officer drive it to the station and the stereo would be removed. And we could give the 
keys back to a family member and they could drive it back home" (R. 143 at 16-17). 
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Mehew "accepted" the second option and gave Bean the keys (R. 143 at 17). Bean 
admitted, however, that while he was at the residence there was no indication that the 
vehicle was going to be moved (R. 143 at 21). Bean also testified that he was acting on 
the instructions of his supervisor (R. 143 at 22). 
Bean had the vehicle driven to the Provo Police Department where an inventory 
search was performed by Officer Ahlborn, and the stereo was removed (R. 143 at 17). 
The keys were later returned to Mehew's family (R. 143 at 17). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mehew asserts that the seizure of her vehicle from her driveway, and the 
subsequent search of that vehicle, constituted a warrantless search under the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Mehew further asserts that the seizure 
and search were not justified under the automobile exception: One, because there were 
no exigent circumstances; and two, because the police cannot create the exigency that 
becomes the justification for the seizure. Accordingly, Mehew asks that this Court 
correct the legal conclusion of the trial court that the warrantless seizure and search of 
her vehicle were justified under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment and 
order that this matter be remanded to the Fourth District Court with instructions that her 




THE WARRANTLESS SEIZURE AND SEARCH OF MEHEW'S 
VEHICLE WAS NOT JUSTIFIED UNDER THE AUTOMOBILE 
EXCEPTION TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT'S 
PROHIBITION AGAINST SUCH SEARCHES 
Mehew asserts that the warrantless seizure and subsequent search of her vehicle 
was not justified or permissible under an exception to the Fourth Amendment's 
prohibition against warrantless searches. Accordingly, Mehew requests that this Court 
correct the trial court's legal conclusion that the warrantless seizure and search of her 
vehicle was justified and remand this matter back to the Fourth District Court with 
instructions that her plea is to be withdrawn, the evidence suppressed, and the matter 
dismissed. 
The presumptive rule under Fourth Amendment case law "relating to reasonable 
searches and seizures is that searches may not be conducted without a warrant supported 
by probable cause." State v. James, 2000 UT 80 at %9, 13 P.3d 576. While an individual 
has "a lesser expectation of privacy in a car than in his or her home, one does not lose the 
protection of the Fourth Amendment while in a vehicle." State v. Schlosser, 114 P.2d 
1132, 1135 (Utah 1989). Nevertheless, it is this lessor expectation of privacy that has 
resulted in an "automobile exception" to the warrant rule which allows officers the 
ability to seize or search a vehicle if supported by probable cause of criminal activity and 
exigent circumstances. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280 (1925). See 
also, California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 569, 111 S.Ct. 1982, 1985-86 (1991); State v. 
Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1236 (Utah 1996). 
8 
Mehew concedes that the officers had probable cause of criminal activity (R. 143 
at 4). However, Mehew contests the presence of exigent circumstances. Prior to 
entering conditional pleas to receiving stolen property, Mehew filed two motions to 
suppress: One, she asserted that there were no exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's 
prohibition of warantless searches and seizures that could justify the seizure and search 
of her vehicle; and that the automobile exception did not apply because there were no 
exigent circumstances present at the time of the seizure and subsequent search (R. 41-48, 
143 at 26-28). Two, Mehew asserted that the police could not rely on exigent 
circumstances to justify a seizure and search when they created the exigency (R. 87-92, 
144). The trial court denied both motions concluding that the automobile exception was 
applicable as the seizure/search was supported by probable cause and exigent 
circumstances (R. 143 at 30). 
A. Exigent Circumstances 
Mehew asserts that the trial court erred in concluding that exigent circumstances 
were present at the time the vehicle was seized and subsequently searched. In regards to 
the presence of exigent circumstances, the trial court stated: 
I think the Defendant, although this isn't a stop at the side of the road, I 
think that the Defendant stands in the same place as an occupant who had have 
been there if the car had been stopped at the side of the road. She was aware of 
what was going on. Indeed, she was awakened and aware. She can find her 
friend, or the family can find the friend, or he may just wander by again and use 
the car. I think that the car is at risk of being moved. I think if the car is at risk of 
being moved then we have a risk that there'll be destruction of the evidence.... 
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Exigent circumstances exist when the car is movable, which it certainly is. 
I don't think the automobile exception requires that the car always be at the side of 
a highway. I think that it can be in the street parked. I think that it can be in the 
front of the home as it was here. And you're right, every car is not subject to the 
automobile exception but I think in this case this one is. 
(R. 143 at 30-31). 
However, "Exigent circumstances exist 'only when the inevitable delay incident to 
obtaining a warrant must give way to an urgent need for immediate action.'" State v. 
Wells, 928 P.2d 386, 389 (Utah App. 1996), affirmed by 939 P.2d 1204 (Utah 1997) 
(emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 844 (11th Cir. 
1984). Moreover, the "mere possibility" that evidence might be destroyed is insufficient 
to establish exigent circumstances. Wells, 928 P.2d at 389 (citing State v. Beavers, 859 
P.2d9, 19 (Utah App. 1993). 
Mehew asserts that the possible exigencies relied on by the police to justify the 
warrantless seizure and search of her vehicle are insufficient. One, practically all 
vehicles are capable of movement. However, the police did not observe any occupants in 
Mehew's vehicle. In addition, the car was not being driven on the street but was parked 
in the driveway of her residence in the middle of the night; and Mehew had already been 
interrogated and arrested. Moreover, the only concern articulated by Officer Bean was 
that it was a possibility that family members could remove the vehicle from the presence 
or destroy the evidence in the car or alert the boyfriend to the situation and he could 
remove the vehicle or its contents (R. 143 at 15-16). 
Mehew asserts that this "mere possibility" that evidence could be moved or 
destroyed is insufficient to establish exigent circumstances. Furthermore, there was no 
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urgent need to immediately seize and search the vehicle when four officers were present 
at the scene and could have conducted surveillance and sought to obtain a warrant 
particularly as it was the middle of the night and the vehicle was parked in the driveway 
with no occupants in sight when Officer Bean observed the brand of stereo through the 
vehicle's window. 
Accordingly, Mehew asks that this Court correct erroneous conclusion of the trial 
court that the warrantless seizure and search of her vehicle was justified under the 
automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment because of the presence of probable 
cause and exigent circumstances. 
B. Police Created Exigency 
Mehew also argued before the trial court that the police could not rely on exigent 
circumstances that they created to justify a warrantless seizure and search of her vehicle 
(R. 87-92, 144). In relation to this issue, which was raised in Mehew's second motion to 
suppress, the trial court concluded that "the investigating officer did not create an exigent 
circumstance in order to justify a seizure of the defendant's vehicle" (R. 104). In so 
concluding, the trial court decided that State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9 (Utah App. 1993), 
and State v. Kelly9 963 P.2d 1211 (Idaho App. 1998), did not apply to this case because 
they involved seizures at residences and not vehicles (R. 104). 
In State v. Beavers the police responded to reports of a loud argument and 
possible assault at an apartment complex. When police arrived at the apartment they 
noticed that the door jamb had been broken and the door was ajar. In addition, the 
officers could hear male voices arguing inside and so they remained outside the 
apartment and listened to the dispute which seemed to focus on the price of some coats in 
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the apartment. At some point one of the individuals walked out the door of the 
apartment, but jumped back inside when he saw the police. One of the officers reached 
inside the apartment and grabbed the individual and detained him in a prone position on 
the ground. Subsequent movements by the other individuals in the apartment led the 
officers to enter the apartment with guns drawn and to seize the remaining three 
individuals. A check of the apartment led to the discovery of a 'large number of new 
coats hanging in closets." The defendant and two others were subsequently charged 
with felony theft and burglary. 859 P.2d at 10-11. 
The State argued that the officers' initial entry into the apartment was necessitated 
by exigent circumstances because the police were faced with a dangerous situation and 
were justified in entering the apartment for their own safety. In addressing this issue, this 
Court held: "The existence of exigent circumstances must be based on the reasonable 
belief of the police officer. Any legitimate concern for which police claim for their 
safety must of necessity arise before the challenged entry. Moreover, police cannot 
create the exigency in order to justify a warrantless entry.'" Beavers, 859 P.2d at 18 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
In State v. Kelly an officer was dispatched to investigate a possible arson at 
approximately 1:30 a.m. When the officer arrived at the scene he received information 
from a homeowner that a "Jason Kelly" may have been responsible for the fire. While 
investigating the scene of the fire the officer observed some footprints in the snow and 
followed them to a house. The officer then looked through a window in the door and 
observed a man in the living room wearing a coat and a hat. The officer knocked on the 
door and the man glanced at the officer and then walked further into the house. The 
officer knocked again and the knock was answered by a woman who appeared confused 
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when the officer asked if "Jason Kelly" lived in the house. Without answering the 
inquiry, the woman turned and walked back into the house. The officer followed and 
shortly thereafter discovered the defendant, Thomas Edward Kelly, in a bedroom. The 
officer questioned Kelly and then conducted a pat down search and discovered that one 
of his sleeve's was soaked with gasoline. The officer also found a spout from a gas can 
and a marijuana pipe in Kelly's coat pocket. Kelly was then arrested and ultimately 
charged with arson. Kelly, 963 P.2d at 1212. 
Kelly filed a motion to suppress all of the evidence obtained as a result of the 
warrantless entry into the residence. The State argued that the officer's entry into the 
house was justified by exigent circumstances—the necessity to prevent the defendant 
from escaping or destroying evidence. 963 P.2d at 1212. The Idaho Court of Appeals 
reversed the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress. In reaching this conclusion the 
Kelly court held: 
... any exigency that arose here was of Officer Bitton's own making. There 
was no threat of immediate destruction of evidence or flight by a suspect until 
Officer Bitton knocked on the door of the residence, thereby alerting Kelly to the 
officer's presence. Until then, Officer Bitton could have retreated undetected and 
could have obtained a search warrant without fear that the suspect would be 
prompted to flee or to destroy valuable evidence. 
Many other courts have held that a warrantless entry will not be justified by 
a police-created exigency, at least where the police conduct was unnecessary in 
view of available alternatives. 
963 P.2d at 1213. The Idaho court then cited several additional cases from other 
jurisdictions-including the Beavers case-that stand for the proposition that when 
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officers rely on an exigency in order to justify a warrantless search, that exigency cannot 
be police created. Id. Finally the Kelly court concluded that "because the claimed 
exigency was readily avoidable and was produced by the police officer's own 
unnecessary action, it did not validate the warrantless entry. To rule otherwise would 
allow officers to nullify the warrant requirement by needlessly creating an exigency." 
963P.2dat 1214. 
Mehew again asserts that the holdings of Beavers and Kelly are applicable in this 
case because the same requirements that are necessary for a warrantless search at a 
residence—probable cause and exigent circumstances—are also required under the 
automobile exception. Individuals may have a lessor expectation of privacy in a vehicle 
than in a residence. Schlosser, 714 P.2d at 1135. And the State may bear a heavier 
burden of proving exigent circumstances for entry into a home as opposed to that 
required for the seizure of a vehicle. See Beavers, 859 P.2d at 13 (citing Welsh v. 
Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749-50, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 2097 (1984), and State v. Ramirez, 
814 P.2d 1131,1133 (Utah App. 1991)). However, if the police cannot create an 
exigency in order to justify a warrantless search of a residence, it logically follows that 
they cannot rely on an exigency they created as justification to search an automobile. 
The exigencies relied on by the State in this case are as follows: the car was 
moveable, the occupants of the residence (excluding Mehew who was arrested) were 
alerted and could either destroy the evidence themselves or allow the defendant's 
boyfriend to move the vehicle or remove its contents. However, like Beavers and Kelly, 
the police in this case completely created the exigencies which they rely on to justify the 
seizure and subsequent search of Mehew's vehicle which was parked in her driveway. 
The police put Mehew and her family on notice of the investigation by interrogating 
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Mehew and arresting her without first seeking to obtain a warrant. These "claimed 
exigencies were readily avoidable" and "produced by the police officer's own 
unnecessary action" of alerting Mehew (who was asleep) and her family of the 
investigation by approaching the residence and interrogating her and her family in the 
middle of the night. Bean had three other officers present at the Mehew residence. In 
addition, several alternatives to a warrantless seizure of the vehicle were available to the 
officers—including surveillance of the residence by one of the officers until a warrant 
could be obtained. 
Because any claimed exigency was avoidable and produced by the unnecessary 
actions of Officer Bean and the other officers, Mehew asks that this Court conclude that 
the trial court erred in finding that the police did not create the exigent circumstance(s) 
that they relied on in order to justify the seizure and subsequent search of her vehicle. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Mehew asks that this Court reverse the trial court's 
denial of her motions to suppress. Mehew further asks that this matter be remanded to 
the Fourth District Court with instructions that her pleas are to be withdrawn, that all 
evidence obtained as a result of the warrantless search and seizure is to be suppressed, 
and that the matter is to be dismissed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2nd day of October, 2002. 
Margaret P. Lindsay 
Counsel for Appellant 
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Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
C A R ^ \ B ^ C . M 5 T H , C ' - ' < 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH COUNTY 




MOTION AND MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS 
Case No. 001404574 FS 
JUDGE LAYCOCK 
The defendant, EMILY MEHEW, by and through her attorney of record, JARED W. 
ELDRIDGE, respectfully moves this Court to suppress evidence obtained as a result nf an 
unlawful search and seizure of Ms. Mehew's vehicle. Ms. Mehew bases her motion on the 
following memorandum. 
FACTS 
1. Officer Bean of the Provo City Police Department suspected an acquaintance of Ms. 
Mehew of being involved in impersonating and forging the name of another to buy a car CD 
player from Sound Warehouse. 
2. Having no promising leads as to who this person might be, Officer Bean decided to 
contact Ms. Mehew who was the owner of a vehicle that matched the description of a vehicle in 
which the car CD player was installed. 
3. Officer Bean, with other officers, went to Ms. Mehew's residence where they saw her 
vehicle sitting in the driveway. 
4. The officers walked up the private driveway of Ms. Mehew's residence where the 
suspect vehicle was parked. The officers looked inside and could see a CD player which looked 
similar to the one that Officer Bean thought had been fraudulently purchased at Sound 
Warehouse. 
5. The officers went to the door of the residence and summoned Ms. Mehew who was 
sleeping. The officers entered the house and eventually met with Ms. Mehew who had just 
woken up. 
6. After asking Ms. Mehew questions, Officer Bean concluded that she was withholding 
information about who her acquaintance was. 
7. Officer Bean placed Ms. Mehew under arrest for "obstruction of justice" and 
possession of stolen property. 
8. It was not apparent to the Officer Bean that Ms. Mehew's vehicle was likely to be 
moved while he was present. 
8. The vehicle was seized; another officer drove the vehicle from Ms. Mehew's residence 
to the police station where a search was conducted. 
9. The search revealed a checkbook and day planner that did not belong to Ms. Mehew. 
ARGUMENT 
I. WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING A WARRANT, THE OFFICER'S UNINVITED 
ENTRY ON TO PRIVATE PROPERTY TO SEARCH INSIDE MS. MEHEW'S 
VEHICLE RESULTED IN AN UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND SEIZURE. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution was created to protect "[t]he 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures." U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV. Based on the protections inherent within 
this clause and their application to Utah case law, the scope of an officer's authority to conduct a 
warrantless search is restricted: 
"This Court has held that absent one of a narrow category of exigent circumstances, 
warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. . . . 
That principle has much, if not more, force under the Utah Constitution." 
State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568, 571 (Utah 1991) (see also, State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 855 
(Utah 1992) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). "Warrantless searches are 
per se unreasonable unless undertaken pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant 
requirement."). 
If conducting a search or seizure without a warrant, the State must demonstrate "that the 
circumstances of the search or seizure constitute an exception to the warrant requirement." State 
v. Strickling, 844 P.2d 979, 985 (Utah App. 1992); (see also State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, 
411 (Utah 1984) ("Since the officers had no warrant, it was the burden of the State to show that 
the search was lawful."). 
Referring specifically to vehicle searches and seizures, the Utah Supreme Court has held 
that although Utah residents may have less of an expectation of privacy in a vehicle than in his or 
her home, "a car's interior as a whole is . . . subject to Fourth Amendment protection from 
unreasonable intrusions by the police." State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989). 
Ms. Mehew contends, based upon Officer Bean's police report and investigation, that the 
search and seizure of her vehicle was unlawful because the officers involved did not first obtain a 
search warrant before the search and seizure of her vehicle occurred. Ms. Mehew further 
contends that the State cannot justify the search based on an exception to the warrant 
requirement. Therefore, the evidence obtained as a result of the illegal search and seizure of Ms. 
Mehew's vehicle is inadmissible. "Our cases make it clear that searches of motorcars must meet 
the test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment before evidence obtained as a result of 
such searches is admissible." Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 160(1949). 
II. THE STATE CAN NOT JUSTIFY THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE UNDER ANY 
EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT. 
The "consent" exception does not apply in the instant case; Officers searched the vehicle 
before they summoned or conversed with the owner of the vehicle, Ms. Mehew, who was inside 
her house asleep. Nor did anyone else, who was privy to do so, or otherwise, give the officers 
consent to search or seize the vehicle parked in the private drive at Ms. Mehew's residence. 
The "hot pursuit" exception does not apply in the instant case because the vehicle was 
parked in the driveway, unoccupied, and immobile. 
The "plain view" exception does not apply in the instant case. First, "The second 
limitation [on the plain view doctrine] is that the discovery of evidence in plain view must be 
inadvertent.. . [b]ut where the discovery is anticipated, where the police know m advance the 
location of the evidence and intend to seize it, the situation is altogether different." Coolidge v. 
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (citing Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498. The reason 
the officers went to the house was to see if the CD player was in the Ms. Mehew's vehicle. This 
is not inadvertence; they were specifically intending to seize the vehicle. Second, without a 
warrant, officers did not view incriminating evidence from a lawful vantage point. "We decline 
the plain view doctrine because the evidence was not discovered incident to a prior justified 
intrusion but was instead the result of an uninvited entry by which the police officers achieved 
'plain view.'" State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175 (1983); (See also, Coolidge v. New Hampshire. 403 
U.S. 443 (1971) ("The limits on the [plain view] doctrine are implicit in the statement of its 
rationale. The first of these is that plain view alone is never enough to justify the warrantless 
seizure of evidence . . . Incontrovertible testimony of the senses that an incriminating object is on 
premises belonging to a criminal suspect maybe established the fullest possible measure of 
probable cause. But even where the object is contraband, this Court has repeatedly stated and 
enforced the basic rule that police may not enter and make a warrantlesss seizure." 
The "search incident to a valid arrest" exception does not apply in the instant case 
because the vehicle was searched, and the items in the backpack were found at the police station, 
too far attenuated to be incident to the arrest. (Preliminary Hearing Transcript at 35). "The 
search of the car was not undertaken until petitioner and his companions had been arrested and 
taken in custody to the police station and the car had been towed to the garage . . . . We think that 
the search was too remote in time or place to have been made as incidental to the arrest and 
conclude, therefore, that the search of the car without a warrant failed to meet the test of 
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment, rendering the evidence obtained as a result of the 
search inadmissible." Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964). (See also, Vale v. 
Louisiana, 399, U.S. 30,33) ("[a] search may be incident to an arrest only if it is substantially 
contemporaneous with the arrest and is confined to the immediate vicinity of the arrest.") 
The "exigent circumstances" exception does not apply in the instant case. Exigent 
circumstances exist "only when the inevitable delay incident to obtaining a warrant must give 
way to an urgent need for immediate action." State v. Wells, 928 P.2d 386 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) 
(citing Unites States v. SatterfiekL 743 F.2d 827, 844 (11th Cir. 1984); (See also, Coolidge v. 
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (exigent circumstances applies where an automobile is 
stopped on the highway "where there is probable cause, because the car is 'movable, the 
occupants are alerted, and the car's contents may never be found again if a warrant must be 
obtained."). Further, Utah courts have identified examples of what constitutes exigent 
circumstances: "the immediate need to prevent harm to the officers, destruction of evidence, or 
escape of the suspect." Id. at 389. No exigent circumstances existed in the instant case. 
The "inventory search" exception does not apply in the instant case. "Even assuming, 
arguendo, that the police might have searched the Pontiac in the driveway when they arrested 
Coolidge in the house, Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, makes plain that they could not 
legally seize the car, remove it, and search it at their leisure without a warrant." (See also 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) ("There [referring to another case] the police 
lacked probable cause to seize or search the defendant's automobile at the time of his arrest, and 
this was enough by itself to condemn the subsequent search at the station house. Here there was 
probable cause, but no exigent circumstances justified the police proceeding without a warrant. 
As in Dyke, the later search at the station house was therefore illegal." Regardless, the inventory 
search in the instant case was subsequent to the unlawful search and seizure of the vehicle. 
The "automobile exception" does not apply because exigent circumstances were entirely 
absent. In fact, when Officer Bean was asked if it was apparent that the car was going to be 
moved, he indicated as long as he was present at the scene he did not believe the car would be 
moved. (Preliminary Hearing Transcript at 35-36). 
In a case similar to the instant case, State v. Lorocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990), an 
officer observed a vehicle, parked on a public street, and in front of what later proved to be the 
defendant's residence. Because the officer had information indicating that the vehicle might be 
stolen, he approached the vehicle, peered into the vehicle through the windshield, and looked at 
the VIN number located on the dashboard. The officer then, without a warrant, opened the 
unlocked door and observed the VIN on the safety standard sticker on the inside edge of the door 
which matched that of the stolen vehicle. The officer then went to defendant's home, read him 
his Miranda rights, and arrested him. 
In stating that "a constitutional privacy interest exists in the interior of an automobile and 
that the opening of the car door by the police officer here constituted a search," the court 
reaffirmed that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement applies only if the police 
"have probable cause to believe that the automobile contains either contraband or evidence of a 
crime and that they may be lost if not immediately seized" Id. at 469. (Citing Christensen, 676 
P.2d at 411). (Emphasis added). The court held that the opening of the car door to inspect the 
VIN constituted an unreasonable search under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution, 
because there was an absence of exigent circumstances, and therefore, a warrant was required 
prior to the search. 
CONCLUSION 
Pursuant to the Utah and United States Constitutions, warrantless searches are 
unreasonable per se unless an exception to the warrant requirement justifies the intrusion. No 
warrant was obtained in the instant case, nor did an exception to the warrant requirement exist. 
Under the circumstances in present in this case - where Officer Bean for some time had 
known of the probable role of the car in the alleged crime - he had ample opportunity to obtain a 
warrant. Even while at Ms. Mehew's house, a telephonic warrant would not have been an 
unreasonable solution. The whole purpose of the warrant requirement, which is sometimes not 
grasped by zealous yet good-intentioned officers, is not that it denies law enforcement inferences 
which a reasonable persons would draw from an investigation. Rather, the puipose is requiring 
that those inferences be drawn by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government 
enforcement agent. 
Ms. Mehew respectfully requests this Court to rule inadmissable any evidence obtained 
as a result of the illegal search and seizure. 
DATED this J§L day of June, 2001. 
JAR^D W. ELrfRIDGE 
Attorney for Defendant 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Plaintiff, 
EMILY MEHEW, Case No. 00M3ai2Z6 
JUDGE LAYCOCK 
Defendant. 
The Defendant, EMILY MEHEW, by and through her attorney, JARED W. ELDRIDGE, 
moves this Court to suppress evidence discovered in a search of her car based on exigent 
circumstances created by police officers. 
FACTS 
In November, 2000, Officer Hiatt Bean investigated a report of an automobile burglary 
and the subsequent unauthorized use of a financial transaction card taken during the automobile 
burglary. In his investigation Officer Bean discovered that the financial transaction card had been 
used at Jiffey Lube in Lindon and at Sound Warehouse in Orem. (Preliminary Hearing 
Transcript, "PH" at 24-25). During his investigation Officer Bean discovered that a vehicle 
registered to Emily Mehew was serviced at the Jiffey Lube and that a stereo was purchased and 
installed in the same vehicle at Sound Warehouse. (PH at 25). After discovering Ms. Mehew's 
connection to this case Officer Bean and several other officers went to Ms. Mehew's residence to 
talk to her. (PH at 28). While approaching Ms. Mehew's house and before talking to her, Officer 
Bean looked in Ms. Mehew's car and observed a stereo. (PH at 28). The stereo appeared to be the 
same as one shown to him by Kyle Allman at Sound Warehouse and that Mr. Allman told him 
had been installed in the car. (PH at 28). Officer Bean then went to the door of the house, talked 
Ms. Mehew's sister, mother and eventually Ms. Mehew. Following this interview, Officer Bean 
placed Ms. Mehew under arrest and seized her vehicle that was parked in the driveway. (PH at 
28-29, 33). The vehicle was taken to the police station where it was eventually searched. 
The Defendant submitted a motion to suppress evidence found as a result of a search of 
her vehicle. The Court found that the automobile exception applied to this case by implementing 
the following criteria articulated by the Utah Supreme Court, "exigent circumstances exist when, 
'the car is movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car's contents my never be found again if a 
warrant must be obtained.'" State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229,1238 (Utah 1996). In applying this 
criteria the Court found that the search of Ms. Mehew's car was constitutionally justifiable. 
ARGUMENT 
The police cannot create an exigency in order to justify a warrantless search. State v. 
Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 18 (Utah App. 1993). 
In Beavers, police responded to a report of a loud argument and possible assault at an 
apartment complex. Officers went to the apartment where the disturbance occurred. When the 
officers arrived at the apartment they noticed the door jamb had been broken, the door was ajar 
and the officers could hear male voices arguing inside. The officers listened for several minutes 
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to the voices arguing about the price of some coats. The argument the officers overheard 
obviated their concerns about violence but was of some interest to the officers. At some point 
one of the individuals arguing walked out the door of the apartment, but when he saw police 
officers, he jumped back inside. One of the officers reached inside the apartment grabbed the 
individual. This individual was detained as well as other individuals in the apartment. Other 
officers were dispatched to obtain a search warrant. 
In this case the State argued that the officers' initial entry into the apartment was 
necessitated by exigent circumstances. The State argued that police were faced with a dangerous 
situation and were justified in entering the apartment for their own safety. In ruling on the 
constitutionality of the officers' illegal entry and seizure of the defendant the Court of Appeals 
held, 
The existence of exigent circumstances must be based on the reasonable belief of 
the police officer. Moreover, police cannot create the exigency in order to justify a 
warrantless entry. Accordingly, any threat to police safety must have arisen 
before Officer Humphries made his entry by reaching across the threshold into 
[the] apartment to seize Davis. 
Id. (Emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
In applying this case to our current case, it is clear that before Officer Bean ever alerted 
anybody inside of the house to his presence or the reason for his presence, he knew Ms. Mehew 
had been with an individual who was likely using a stolen financial transaction card, that stolen 
financial transaction card had been used to purchase a stereo and to pay for the installation of the 
stereo in Ms. Mehew's car. As Officer Bean walked up the driveway, before anyone inside the 
house had been alerted to their presence, he was able to observe in Ms. Mehew's car what 
appeared to be an identical stereo to the one Sound Warehouse had informed him was installed 
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by them in her car. After compiling this information, instead of seeking to obtain a search 
warrant for Ms. Mehew's car before speaking to her, he chose to interrogate and subsequently 
arrest Ms. Mehew in the early hours of the morning, thus, putting Ms. Mehew and her family on 
notice of the police investigation and giving rise to the exigency the police later relied on to seize 
and search the vehicle. 
The exigency, if there was any, did not arise until after the police interrogated Ms. 
Mehew. After their interrogation and subsequent arrest of Ms. Mehew, officers became 
concerned because Ms. Mehew's boyfriend had access to the parked car and either he or Ms. 
Mehew's family could have moved the car and possibly destroyed evidence. Therefore, police 
deemed these dangers of such an exigent nature that a warrantless seizure and subsequent search 
of the vehicle was justified. 
In an Idaho Court of Appeals case, an officer was dispatched to investigate a possible 
arson at approximately 1:30 a.m. State v. Kellev, 963 P.2d 1211, 1212 (Idaho Ct. App. 1998). 
When the officer arrived at the scene of the crime, he received information from a homeowner 
that a "Jason Kelly" may have been responsible for the fire. Id Shortly after learning this, the 
officer observed some footprints in the snow and followed them to a house. Id, Upon arrival at 
the house, the officer covertly peered through a window in the door and observed a man in the 
living room with a winter coat and hat on. Id The officer then knocked on the door, the man 
inside glanced at the officer and then walked further into the house. Id Eventually a woman 
answered the door. Id The officer asked if "Jason Kelly" lived there, however, the woman 
appeared confused and turned and walked back into the house without answering the officer. Id 
The officer followed the woman into the house and eventually found the defendant in a room 
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where he questioned him and conducted a pat down search where it was discovered that one the 
defendant's coat sleeve was soaked with gasoline. Id. 
The defendant in the Kelly case challenged the officer's illegal entry into the house. The 
State argued that the officer's entry into the house was justified by exigent circumstances in 
order to prevent the defendant from escaping or destroying evidence. Id at 1213. The Court 
ultimately held, 
any exigency that arose here was of Officer Bitton's own making. There was no 
threat of immediate destruction of evidence or flight by a suspect until Officer 
Bitton knocked on the door of the residence, thereby alerting Kelly to the officer's 
presence. Until then, Officer Bitton could have retreated undetected and could 
have obtained a search warrant without fear that the suspect would be prompted to 
flee or to destroy valuable evidence. 
Id. The Court then cites several additional cases from other jurisdictions, including the Beavers 
case cited above, standing for the proposition that when officers rely on an exigency in order to 
justify a warrantless search, that exigency cannot be a police-created exigency. Id Finally, the 
Court concluded, 
because the claimed exigency was readily avoidable and was produced by the 
police officer's own unnecessary action, it did not validate the warrantless entry. 
To rule otherwise would allow officers to nullify the warrant requirement by 
needlessly creating an exigency. 
Idatl214. 
The exigencies the State relies on in our current case are: 1) the car was movable 2) the 
occupants (even though there were no occupants of the vehicle as there were in the Anderson 
case) were alerted and 3) the car's contents may not have been found if a warrant was required. 
In this particular case the key fact seems to be whether or not Ms. Mehew and her family were 
alerted and potentially could have either moved the car or destroyed evidence. 
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Like Beavers and Kelly, the police in this case had no exigency to search Ms. Mehew's 
car until they themselves put Ms. Mehew and her family on notice of their investigation by 
interrogating Ms. Mehew and subsequently arresting her, thereby creating their own exigency to 
justify a seizure and search of the car. Indeed to rule otherwise would allow the officers to nullify 
the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution by needlessly creating 
an exigency. 
CONCLUSION 
The police cannot create their own exigency in order to justify a warrantless search. This 
case is a clear example that, but for the police officers' own conduct, no exigency would have 
existed. Therefore, Ms. Mehew respectfully requests this Court to suppress all evidence 
discovered as a result of the police officers' unconstitutional seizure and search of her vehicle. 
DATED this \b day of June 2001. 
JAREIf W. ELDRTOQE 
Attorney for DefensLaMt 
CERTIFICATE 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the office of the Utah County 




IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : MEMORANDUM DECISION ON 
DEFENDANT'S SECOND MOTION TO 
Plaintiff, SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
vs. : 
EMILY MEHEW : Case No. 001404574 
Defendants. : Judge Claudia Laycock 
This matter came before the Court for oral arguments on defendant's second Motion to 
Suppress on September 5, 2001. The plaintiff, State of Utah, was represented by its attorney, J. 
Christian Rasmussen. The defendant was present and represented by Jared W. Eldridge. Having 
reviewed the file, the transcript of the preliminary hearing, the memoranda presented by both 
parties, and the oral arguments made by the parties, the Court now enters its 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Officer Bean of the Provo Police Department took two report s of vehicle burglary and 
theft from Joel Clark and Dustin Dastrup. 
2. Joel Clark had done some investigation on his own and had discovered that his wife 
Linda's debit card had been used at three businesses: a Chevron gas station, Jiffy Lube, Sound 
Warehouse. Neither Joel nor Linda Clark made any purchases at Jiffy Lube or Sound Warehouse 
immediately following the burglary of his vehicle and the theft of Linda's debit card. 
3. In Dustin Dastrup's backpack, which was stolen from his vehicle, was his wallet, which 
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contained checks, credit cards and some cash. Dustin Dastrup made no purchases at Jiffy Lube or 
Sound Warehouse immediately following the theft of his backpack and its contents. 
4. Officer Bean contacted Jiffy Lube and obtained the description and license plate 
number of the car serviced, a description of the person signing the receipt, and a copy of the 
receipt on which the name 'TXistin Dastrup" was signed. 
5. By running the license plate number, Officer Bean learned that the car serviced at Jiffy 
Lube was registered to the defendant, Emily Mehew. 
6. At Sound Warehouse, Officer Bean spoke to the employee who had sold stereo 
equipment to a person identifying himself as 'Dustin Dastrup." This "Dustin Dastrup" used the 
same debit card that had been used at Jiffy Lube, claiming the name on the debit card, Linda 
Clark, was that of his mother. 
7. The employee from Sound Warehouse also stated that a female he later identified as 
Emily Mehew (identified through a photo display and through his prior acquaintance with the 
defendant) was with the person identified as fcCDustin Dastrup" at the time of the installation of the 
stereo equipment into the vehicle. The employee showed Officer Bean what the faceplate of the 
installed stereo system looked like. 
8. Officer Bean learned that the vehicle into which the equipment had been installed had 
the same license plate number and description as the vehicle which had been serviced at Jiffy 
Lube, i.e., the defendant Emily Mehew's vehicle. 
9. Officer Bean went to the defendant's home, after having officers of the Orem Police 
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Department drive by her address and verify that a vehicle matching the description of the car 
described by employees of Jiffy Lube and Sound Warehouse was at her home. 
10. When he arrived at the defendant's home, he looked through the window of the 
vehicle and observed an installed stereo which matched the face plate of the stereo shown to him 
at Sound Warehouse. 
11. At this point of the investigation, Officer Bean still did not know the true identity of 
the person identifying himself as ccDustin Dastrup" at Jifly Lube and Sound Warehouse. 
12. Officer Bean then went to the door of the home and was admitted by family members. 
13. Defendant's sister told the officer that defendant was asleep. In response to his 
question, defendant's mother and sister also told him that the defendant's boyfriend's name was 
"Tyson," but that they did not know his last name. 
14. The defendant eventually came upstairs and spoke with the officer, admitting that she 
had been at Sound Warehouse with <cDustin," and then later admitting that his name was really 
Tyson." She refused to give the officer Tyson's last name, his address, or any additional 
information about him. 
15. The defendant and her family members told the officer that Tyson had access to the 
vehicle and that he borrowed it from time to time. 
16. As a result of the interview, Officer Bean seized the vehicle located at the defendant's 
home-the vehicle which matched the description of the vehicle seen at the two businesses 
17 During an inventory search of the vehicle, he found various items which had been 
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stolen in the two vehicle burglaries. 
DISCUSSION 
L State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9 (Utah App. 1993) 
Defendant argues that the search of her vehicle was constitutionally unjustifiable because, 
when Officer Bean went to defendant's home, interviewed her, and alerted her and her family 
members regarding their investigation, Officer Bean created an exigency in order to justify a 
warrantless search of her vehicle. Defendant relies upon the reasoning in State v. Beavers, 859 
P.2d 9 (Utah App. 1993) and Idaho v. Kelly, 963 P.2d 1211 (Idaho Ct. of App. 1998). Plaintiff 
responds that Beavers and Kelly can be distinguished factually and, therefore, do not apply to the 
instant case. 
In Beavers police officers responded to an apartment building for a report of a loud 
argument and a possible assault. Upon arriving at the subject apartment, the officers noticed a 
broken door jam, a door that was ajar, and male voices arguing inside. The officers listened for 2-
4 minutes outside the slightly opened door, "during which time they heard an argument over the 
price of coats." Id at 11. The officers heard nothing which confirmed the possibility of an 
assault or other violence, but they continued to listen. When one of the males stepped through 
the door of the apartment into the hallway, he saw the officers and immediately "stepped back 
across the threshold about a half an arm length into the apartment." Id One of the officers 
reached across the threshold and grabbed the male's shoulder, throwing him to the ground and 
detaining him. At that time he saw 3 more people inside the apartment, two of whom immediately 
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fled out of view. Because he feared for the safety of the officers present, he and another officer 
entered the apartment with guns drawn and seized all three occupants. While checking the rest of 
the apartment for other persons, he found a large number of coats, which were determined to be 
stolen. 
In the instant case, the defendant's one-paragraph analysis of the Beavers court's legal 
reasoning jumps directly to the holding that the "police cannot create the exigency in order to 
justify a warrantless entry/' Id at 18. This Court believes that leaping immediately to a 
consideration of that issue ignores the majority of the analysis outlined by the appellate court. 
The Court first considered the following issue: 
whether the Fourth Amendment permits a warrantless entry into a private 
residence on the basis of reasonable, articulable suspicion-the level of suspicion 
necessary to justify an investigatory Terry stop-or whether such an entry is 
justified solely on the basis of probable cause and exigent circumstances. 
Id, at 13. After noting that the officer's reaching across the threshold of the apartment to seize 
the retreating male was a seizure occurring '"within the constitutionally protected confines of a 
private residence, where citizens enjoy a heightened expectation of privacy," id, the court quoted 
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587-590 (1967) for the concept that "[a]bsent exigent 
circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant" and that, even 
when exigency exists, the Fourth Amendment always requires probable cause as a basis for entry 
into a private residence. Beavers at 13-14. 
The Beavers court then rejected the State's argument that "hot pursuit" required only 
articulable (reasonable) suspicion (and, in a footnote, rejected the notion that "hot pursuit" had 
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actually occurred in the Beavers facts), finding that an "extension of the Terry doctrine to 
warrantless entries of private premises is contrary to Fourth Amendment principles." Id at 17. 
The Court then turned to an analysis of whether the officers7 seizure inside the apartment in 
Beavers was justified under establish Fourth Amendment principles, i.e., whether such an entry 
was justified solely on the basis of probable cause and exigent circumstances. 
The Beavers court defined exigent circumstances as those 
that would cause a reasonable person to believe that entry . . . was necessary to 
prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons, the destruction of relevant 
evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some other consequence improperly 
frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts. 
Id at 18, quoting United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1199 (9th. Cir. 1984). The facts in 
Beavers required analysis only under the factor dealing with preventing physical harm to the 
officers. The Court noted that the "existence of exigent circumstances must be based on the 
reasonable belief of the police officer," and that any "legitimate concern which police claim for 
their safety must of necessity arise before the challenged entry." Id at 18, cites omitted. And, 
finally, the Court noted that "police cannot create the exigency in order to justify a warrantless 
entry." Id, cite omitted. 
In it analysis of the facts in Beaver, the Court held that any threat to police safety must 
have arisen before the officer reached across the threshold to seize the male occupant as he 
stepped back into the apartment; indeed, the Court found that no such threat to police safety 
occurred until after the officer reached across the threshold and saw the two of the three 
occupants running to hide. Furthermore, the officer's own testimony belied his claim that he had 
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a reasonable belief that he was in danger; he testified that he "did not think to look for weapons." 
Id at 19. 
Because the Court found that exigent circumstances could not justify the police intrusion 
in Beavers, the Court reversed and remanded the matter without addressing the other prong of the 
test-probable cause for the entry into the apartment. 
EL Beavers and the instant case 
This Court finds that Beavers and the instant case are quite different factually. Beavers 
deals very specifically in its facts and analysis with the Fourth Amendment and warrantless 
searches of residences, not vehicles. In the instant case, the entry into the home where defendant 
was residing was made with consent, not through force or surprise. Officer Bean was allowed 
into the home by the defendant's mother and sister as he merely continued his investigation into 
the facts surrounding the use of Linda Clark's debit card and the unauthorized use of Dustin 
Dastrup's name. The home was never seized, there was no warrantless entry into the home, nor 
did Officer Bean exploit a warrantless entry into the home to further create an exigency in order 
to justify a warrantless search and seizure of the home. He did not continue past the mother and 
sister fijrther into the home in order to find the defendant, who was sleeping downstairs when he 
first arrived, nor did he find anything of evidentiary nature while in the home. 
It is the defendant's argument that the officer, as per Beavers, created exigent 
circumstances when he went into the home to interview the defendant-when he obtained 
information through his interviews with the defendant, her mother, and her sister that gave him 
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reason to believe that the not-completely-identified "Tyson" might have ready access to the car, 
which would lead to the destruction of relevant evidence. It is also the defendant's position that 
Beavers would have required the officer to obtain a search warrant for the vehicle before he ever 
attempted to interview the defendant, thereby avoiding the possibility of creating the exigency 
which lead to the warrantless search of the vehicle. 
This Court believes that the defendant's arguments are an effort to impermissibly 
'"bootstrap" the facts of the instant matter into Beavers. Defendant seeks to determine the order 
in which the officer proceeds with his investigation, i.e., whether he interviews a possible 
accomplice first or obtains a search warrant for her vehicle. Because defendant believes that the 
officer had obtained enough information for a search warrant of the vehicle before knocking on 
the defendant's door, defendant argues that Beavers would require the officer to delay the 
interview of defendant until after he had alerted her to the investigation by searching the vehicle. 
In other words, defendant seeks to place the officer in a "Catch 22." Under this theory, had the 
officer searched the car first with the aid of a search warrant, he would have alerted the defendant, 
created an exigency, probably requiring an arrest, and any information he could obtained from the 
defendant thereafter would have been subject to suppression. 
Furthermore, it is clear to this Court that the information the officer received inside the 
house was given to him voluntarily by the defendant, her mother and sister. The mother and sister 
could not tell him "Tyson's" last name because they did not know it. The defendant chose not to 
give the officer the information he sought. The officer took no overt actions, as in Beavers, 
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which were the result of a warrantless entry into the defendant's home. It was the information 
given or not given by the defendant and her family which created any concern on the part of the 
officer, leading to the warrantless search of the vehicle. 
Lastly, in Beavers the Court held that any threat to police safety must have arisen before 
the officer reached across the threshold to seize the male occupant as he stepped back into the 
apartment. Using that analysis, it is clear that any threat of possible destruction of evidence to be 
found in the vehicle arose before the officer ever knocked on the door to interview the defendant. 
"Tyson's" accessibility to the vehicle was a fact in existence even before the officer discovered 
that 'Tyson," apparently, had ready access to the vehicle. The officer's questions did not create 
the possibility that 'Tyson" would take off with the car; that was a fact already in existence. 
"Tyson" had used the car before and would use it again, regardless of the officer's questions that 
night. The only fact that was added was that the defendant or her family members might tell him 
that an investigation was ongoing, giving 'Tyson" a reason not to return the car, as he had always 
done before. 
Clearly, Beavers was meant to apply to cases dealing with the warantless entry of officers 
into residences, not vehicles. This Court finds that Beavers does not apply to the instant case, 
that the officer did not create an exigency when he interviewed the defendant in the course of his 
investigation, and that he lawfully seized the vehicle, based on probable cause and exigent 
circumstances, pursuant to the Court's ruling on the defendant's first Motion to Suppress. 
TBL Idaho v. Kelly, 963 PJd 1211 (Idaho Ct of App. 1998) 
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Defendant also relies on Idaho v. Kelly, 963 P.2d 1211 (Idaho Ct. of App. 1998) for the 
same reasoning and arguments. As per its reasoning above, this Court finds that Kelly does not 
apply. It, too, is a case which deals with a warrantless entry into a suspect's home. Kelly goes 
even one step further in its analysis than Beavers, finding that the officer's knock upon the 
suspect's door alerted the suspect to the officer's presence and, thereby, created exigent 
circumstances. This Court does not believe that Beavers justifies a similar conclusion. To apply 
that reasoning to Beavers, the officers' mere presence outside the door of the apartment in 
Beavers would have created exigent circumstances; the Beavers Court clearly found that it was 
the officer's reaching across the threshold and viewing the fleeing occupants, which created the 
exigency. At any rate, this Court still believes that both Kelly and Beavers are inapplicable to the 
instant case, as their analyses deal with warrantless entries into residences, rather than vehicles. 
IV. Conclusion 
Therefore, the Court concludes that there was no warrantless entry into or search or 
seizure of the defendant's residence and that the investigating officer did not create an exigent 
circumstance in order to justify a seizure of the defendant's vehicle. The Court DENIES 
defendant's second Motion to Suppress. 




District Court Judge 
